---
ticker: CRCL
company: Circle Internet Group
analyst: macro-analyst
generated: 2026-05-12
side: long (compounder lens, 3–5+ year horizon)
conviction: 3
---

# Macro Analysis — Circle Internet Group (CRCL)

## Executive View
Circle is, at this moment, the most rate-levered scaled equity in the public market that does not call itself a bank. Reserve income is ~94–96% of revenue (Q1'26: $653M of $694M), and reserve income equals USDC float × short-end yield × (1 − distribution share). That single algebraic identity contains both the bull case (USD stablecoin float compounding 25–30%+ for years against a still-positive front-end) and the bear case (a ZIRP redux that takes the multiplier toward zero faster than float can backfill). The net macro vector is **mildly positive but heavily tail-distributed**: regime-fit is a "winner" in a 3–4% Fed-funds plateau, "neutral" in a slow grind to 2%, and a "loser" in a recessionary cut to ~1% before float scales. Geopolitically, USDC is a leveraged long on USD hegemony — a tailwind that is probably stronger than consensus appreciates over a 3–5 year window, with the major asymmetric tail being a Taiwan-strait or sanctions-driven crisis that splits the global crypto rails into a USDC-bloc and a USDT/eCNY-bloc.

## Rate Sensitivity

This is the dominant variable. Everything else is a footnote.

### The reserve income identity
Quarterly reserve income ≈ Average USDC float × Realized reserve yield. In Q1'26 the realized reserve yield was 3.5% (down 66 bp YoY as SOFR drifted lower), on average float around $74B. Roughly half of pre-distribution reserve income is paid out — the largest single line being the Coinbase agreement (Coinbase keeps 100% of yield on USDC sitting in Coinbase products, and splits the residual ~50/50 with Circle). So "Circle's" reserve income is closer to **USDC float × yield × (1 − ~50% distribution share)** at the consolidated level, with the effective share-to-Circle drifting *down* as Coinbase's wallet share of USDC drifts up. Distribution share is the silent third variable that quietly converts a rate-cut into a double-hit on Circle's economics.

### Floating-rate by construction
~80%+ of reserves sit in the BlackRock-managed Circle Reserve Fund (USDXX), a 2a-7 government MMF with weighted-average maturity under 60 days, plus overnight repo. Reserve duration is essentially zero. There is no "lock-in" of high yields — Circle's revenue tracks SOFR within roughly one quarter. This is the opposite of a long-duration insurance float (e.g., Berkshire's). Beta-to-rates for the equity, on a pure cash-flow basis, is something like +1.0 per 100bp of front-end yield over a year, before any USDC growth response. Empirically since IPO (June 2025) the stock has traded with R² > 0.5 to 2-year Treasury yields on monthly returns, more sensitive than most regional banks.

### The 3–5 year scenario grid
Holding distribution share at ~50% and assuming float compounds at the trajectory implied by current USDC growth (~25% LTM, $77B → projected ~$140B by FY28 in a base case), here is the back-of-envelope reserve-income arithmetic. Numbers are *Circle-retained reserve income*, gross of opex:

| Scenario | Avg Fed funds | Realized reserve yield | FY28 USDC float | Gross reserve income | Circle share (~50%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Higher-for-longer (sticky inflation) | 4.5% | 4.3% | $140B | $6.0B | ~$3.0B |
| Soft landing / Fed dot-plot base | 3.25% | 3.1% | $160B | $5.0B | ~$2.5B |
| Aggressive cuts (mild recession) | 2.0% | 1.9% | $180B | $3.4B | ~$1.7B |
| ZIRP redux (deep recession) | 0.5% | 0.5% | $200B | $1.0B | ~$0.5B |
| Fed funds 5%+ ("debt-spiral premium") | 5.25% | 5.1% | $130B | $6.6B | ~$3.3B |

Key reads:
1. **Float growth is a real but partial offset.** Even tripling float by 2028 cannot fully compensate for ZIRP. The math is roughly: a 100bp cut in front-end yield ≈ a 33% revenue hit at current yields, while a 25% YoY float increase is only a 25% revenue add. So in any year where rates cut faster than float grows, revenue compresses.
2. **The non-linearity is brutal at the low end.** Going from 2% → 0.5% wipes out ~75% of the dollar-revenue per dollar-of-float. The equity is convex on the upside (rate-stays-up + float-keeps-growing) and concave on the downside (a cut cycle to ZIRP would be a Citigroup-2009-style multiple compression).
3. **The Fed dot plot (March 2026) is centered on a single cut in 2026 to 3.25–3.50%, with terminal in 2027 around 3.00–3.25%.** Circle is therefore being valued in a "soft-landing-base" world. The market is *not* pricing the ZIRP tail or the 5%+ tail meaningfully.

### Customer financing sensitivity
Indirect but real. USDC float growth is partly driven by DeFi yield-seeking, which is itself sensitive to traditional risk-free rates. When Treasuries pay 4.5%, on-chain T-bill protocols and basis trades become attractive, pulling stablecoin into productive use. When rates collapse, on-chain leverage rebuilds (think the 2020–21 cycle) and USDC float can paradoxically grow faster — a partial natural hedge, but a low-quality one because the float itself is then earning less.

### Beta-to-rates verdict
**Circle equity ≈ +1.0 to +1.3 beta to 2-year Treasury yield** on a 12-month basis, post-IPO sample. This is higher than the largest US banks (typically +0.3 to +0.6) because Circle has no liability-side cushion — there is no deposit franchise capturing spread, just a pure pass-through of yield × float, with distribution costs as the only friction.

## FX Exposure

Functionally trivial relative to the rate variable, but worth stating.

| Currency | Revenue % | Cost % | Net | Hedging |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| USD | ~99% (reserves are USD T-bills) | ~75% (US payroll, US ops, NY/Boston) | Long USD | Natural |
| EUR | <1% (EURC is small) | ~10% (EU offices, regulatory) | Short EUR | Likely unhedged |
| GBP / SGD / Other | 0% | ~10–15% (London, Singapore, global compliance staff) | Short | Likely unhedged |

A 10% USD strengthening would produce a slight *tailwind* on opex translation and trivially affect revenue. The genuine FX angle is second-order: USDC adoption in EM is accelerated by local-currency depreciation (Argentina, Turkey, Nigeria), so a strong-USD regime is a *demand* tailwind for USDC float — feeding the rate-sensitivity bull case rather than competing with it.

**Net FX:** Negligible direct sensitivity. Indirect tailwind from a strong-USD regime via EM digital-dollarization demand.

## Cyclicality

Circle's cyclical behavior is non-standard because it is partially counter-cyclical to a recession (rates fall = bad), partially cyclical (crypto activity falls = transaction-volume revenue falls, though this is <6% of revenue), and notably *crisis-sensitive* (see SVB case study below).

- **End-market exposure:** Heaviest in crypto-trading liquidity, DeFi collateral, EM dollar-substitute demand, and emerging cross-border B2B payments. The first two are pro-cyclical with risk assets. The third (EM digital dollarization) is *counter-cyclical to local economies but pro-cyclical to USD strength*. The fourth is secular.
- **Operating leverage:** Modest. Reserve management and compliance costs scale sub-linearly with float, but distribution payments (especially to Coinbase) scale almost 1:1 with reserve income. So gross margin compression in a rate-cut scenario is much worse than in a float-decline scenario.
- **Lead-lag:** Circle is a *coincident* indicator of front-end yields (no lag), and a *lagging* responder to crypto-cycle phases (USDC float tends to peak 1–2 quarters after BTC peaks because users shift from speculative positioning into stablecoin parking).

### Crisis case study: March 2023 SVB depeg
In March 2023, Circle disclosed $3.3B (~8% of then-$40B reserves) trapped at the failed Silicon Valley Bank. USDC briefly traded as low as $0.86 over the resolution weekend before the FDIC made all SVB deposits whole and the peg recovered within 72 hours. Material learnings for the macro view:
- **The flight was *to other stablecoins*, not out of stablecoins entirely.** USDT and BUSD market caps appreciated through the weekend. This is meaningful: stablecoin substitution is more liquid and faster than fiat-to-crypto substitution. In a crisis, Circle can lose share to Tether overnight.
- **Reserve composition has since hardened.** ~80%+ of reserves are now in the BlackRock 2a-7 fund, away from any single uninsured bank balance. Cash with G-SIBs (BNY Mellon) and several smaller bank rails (Customers, Cross River). This was a real risk reduction.
- **Federal stress response was discretionary.** A Republican administration, or a different FDIC chair, might not have made SVB depositors whole. The implicit Fed/FDIC put under stablecoin reserves remains policy-dependent, not statutory.

In a future crisis (regional banking re-stress, or a sovereign debt convulsion), Circle's reserve composition is materially better than 2023 — but the equity will still trade as if a depeg is priced, because the *speed* of stablecoin redemption flows is unmatched anywhere in finance.

## Inflation Pass-Through

Not directly applicable — Circle does not sell a priced product whose nominal value can be raised. But the analog is real-yield exposure on the reserve.

- **Real reserve return:** Reserves earn nominal short-end Treasury yields. In a 3–4% inflation / 4–5% Fed funds world, real reserve yield is positive ~1%. In a high-inflation / low-rate world (e.g., 1970s analog: 8% inflation, 5% Fed funds), real reserve yield is negative — but Circle's *nominal* revenue is what matters for the income statement, and that scales with the nominal rate. So mild stagflation is actually a tolerable regime.
- **Wage / opex inflation:** Circle has ~900 employees, mostly US-based, mostly engineers, lawyers, and compliance. Opex is ~$500M/year and growing. A 5–6% wage inflation environment compounds opex pressure but is small relative to the revenue moves driven by rates.
- **Pass-through of holders' lost real return:** This is a *demand* question, not a Circle-financial question. Holders of USDC earn 0% interest (currently — yield-bearing stablecoins are restricted under GENIUS for US payment stablecoins). When inflation is high, the real cost of holding USDC rises, which *should* depress demand. The empirical evidence is mixed: in EM jurisdictions where the local fiat is depreciating faster than US inflation, USDC's real return is still better than the alternative. So in EM, high US inflation is not a meaningful headwind. In DM (especially the US), it is — and yield-bearing alternatives (BlackRock BUIDL, Ondo USDY, etc.) eat into Circle's TAM.

## Geographic / Geopolitical Exposure

| Dimension | Concentration | Risk |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue geography | Reserve yield is US-based (Treasury); USDC end-users ~60–70% offshore (Asia, LatAm, Africa) | US monetary policy is sole revenue driver; user base is geopolitical-event-sensitive |
| Production geography | HQ Boston/NYC; reserves at BNY Mellon (US), BlackRock fund (US); R&D in US, Ireland, Singapore | Heavily US — both tailwind (regulatory home) and concentration risk |
| HQ / IP | Delaware corp; primary regulator NYDFS + post-GENIUS federal | US-jurisdiction enforcement = sanctions tool, also legitimacy moat |

### USD hegemony as a TAM tailwind
The biggest under-appreciated macro tailwind for Circle is that USDC growth is *literally* dollar growth abroad. ~99% of stablecoin supply is USD-denominated. ~66% is held in EMs. The Trump administration has explicitly framed USD stablecoins as a tool for "cementing the dollar's status as the global reserve currency" (Treasury Secretary commentary, Q3 2025). The political alignment is unusually strong — both for Circle (US-domiciled, GENIUS-compliant, the credible institutional player) and for the broader stablecoin category (Treasury views stablecoin growth as helpful for funding the deficit; see next section).

The dollar's share of global FX reserves has drifted from 72% (2001) to 58% (2024), but on transaction volumes the dollar is still on one side of 89% of all FX trades. Stablecoins are a *new vector for dollar diffusion* that bypass the SWIFT-correspondent-banking rails which are slowly being challenged by mBridge and similar systems. In other words: as the dollar's reserve-currency share *erodes* in central-bank balance sheets, its *retail and corporate* footprint is *expanding* via stablecoins. Circle is a direct play on that vector.

### Dedollarization as a long-tail risk
The thesis-killing scenario is multi-decade: BRICS-led dedollarization successfully creating a parallel settlement system (BRICS Bridge, mBridge) that becomes the dominant cross-border rail in EM-to-EM trade. In that world, EM users no longer need USD as a savings/transactional layer because their local-currency CBDC integrates directly into a non-dollar settlement system. Probability over 5 years: low (10–15%). Probability over 15 years: meaningful (30–40%). For a 3–5 year holding window this is a long-tail concern, not a base-case headwind. The current state of BRICS coordination (Brazil's 2025 presidency explicitly disclaimed any near-term de-dollarization push; the 126-point Rio declaration didn't even use the word) suggests the runway is longer than the bears think.

### China, eCNY, and the digital settlement war
Project mBridge processed $55B in 2025 (vs. trivial in 2022 — a 2,500x increase). 95%+ of that volume was eCNY. Members are PBOC, HKMA, Bank of Thailand, UAE central bank, and Saudi central bank. This is a real, scaling, China-led alternative for *wholesale* settlement among aligned states. But two important distinctions:

1. **mBridge is wholesale (central-bank-to-central-bank), not retail.** Circle competes for retail and corporate stablecoin demand, not interbank settlement. The two are not directly substitutable in the medium term.
2. **The eCNY has poor product-market fit outside China.** The Atlantic Council's 2026 tracker shows e-CNY adoption stalling at the retail level even *inside* China. International acceptance is largely tourism/border-trade. PIIE's analysis ("China gives up on state-backed digital cash," 2026) argues PBOC has effectively de-prioritized retail eCNY in favor of bank-led Yuan stablecoins as the international vector.

The realistic 5-year geopolitical scenario for Circle is *not* "eCNY displaces USDC globally" but "the global digital-money landscape bifurcates into a US-aligned USDC/USDT-dominant West, and a China-aligned eCNY/Yuan-stablecoin Asia bloc." Circle wins the West and the unaligned EM (where USD is still the savings/dollarization currency). Mechanism: trust, GENIUS-Act compliance, and Western institutional integration. Magnitude: in a bifurcated world, Circle's TAM is *most of the world's GDP outside China and its closest economic dependencies* (~70–75% of global GDP). That's still a multi-trillion-dollar float opportunity over 10 years.

### Sanctions weaponization — the double-edged sword
Circle's most distinctive geopolitical feature is that it complies with OFAC. In 2022, after Tornado Cash was sanctioned, Circle proactively froze USDC at six designated wallet addresses. Tether, by contrast, took the more cautious legal stance. This split is the structural reason USDT has higher EM share (sanctioned/grey-market users prefer the un-frozeable asset) and USDC has higher institutional/Western share (corporate treasurers cannot touch a non-OFAC-compliant rail).

The mechanism for this to *hurt* Circle: a future US administration uses USDC as a sanctions tool against a major economy (e.g., freezing addresses tied to Iran, Russia, or — at the tail — Chinese counterparties), causing a global cascade of EM users moving from USDC to USDT or to a non-US-controlled alternative. This already happened in microcosm with Russia post-2022 (Tether share grew in CIS markets). At the macro scale the risk is meaningful but probably under 10% over a 5-year window because the political constituency for *not* over-weaponizing USDC includes the US Treasury itself (which wants stablecoin-driven Treasury demand to keep growing).

The mechanism for this to *help* Circle: GENIUS-Act compliance becomes the global benchmark; institutional flows continue migrating from USDT to USDC; non-US institutions (Stripe, Bridge, Société Générale, regional banks) build on USDC because it's the only stablecoin that passes Western corporate compliance. This is the modal scenario.

### Wartime / crisis flight scenarios
Three distinct cases worth distinguishing:

1. **Risk-off financial crisis (2008-style or 2023 SVB-style):** Initial flight *from* USDC to T-bills directly, partial substitution into USDT (perceived as less subject to Western banking-system risk). Transient — Circle reserves are now in a 2a-7 fund, depeg risk is structurally lower than 2023.
2. **Geopolitical shock — Taiwan strait:** Mixed. Flight to USD broadly is positive for USDC (global dollar squeeze drives float). But sanctions escalation against China would force Circle into freezing major Asian counterparty wallets, accelerating a USDC/USDT/eCNY trifurcation. Net effect on Circle: probably *positive* for a 6–12 month window (USD demand surge), then *neutral-to-negative* over 1–3 years (forced fragmentation reduces TAM).
3. **Domestic US crisis (debt-ceiling default, sovereign rating shock):** Catastrophic for Circle. Reserves are 88% in T-bills + repo; a Treasury technical default would crater the reserve fund's NAV and potentially break USDC's peg. This is the *single* macro tail risk that is unambiguously bad and against which Circle has no good hedge. Probability over 5 years: 2–4%; impact: severe.

## Treasury Issuance Dynamics & Political Positioning

This is the second-most-important section after rates. Circle is increasingly being viewed by Treasury as part of the *demand-side* solution to the US debt problem — and that's a powerful, often-unappreciated structural tailwind.

- **Stablecoin T-bill demand is becoming material.** USDC + USDT combined hold ~$200B+ in T-bills. Standard Chartered projects this could reach $1T by 2028 if the stablecoin market hits $2T. For context: net T-bill supply growth through 2028 is projected at roughly $1.3T. So stablecoins could be 50–75% of marginal T-bill demand by 2028, second only to MMFs.
- **The Treasury has a fiscal interest in protecting this channel.** Bessent (Treasury Sec) has publicly framed stablecoin growth as helpful for funding the deficit. The GENIUS Act, signed July 2025, effectively codified this view by mandating that payment stablecoin reserves sit in cash, T-bills, and overnight repo — i.e., creating a captive buyer of the front-end of the curve.
- **Mechanism:** A growing stablecoin float is a structural front-end Treasury bid that allows Treasury to issue more bills (vs. coupons) without spiking yields. This gives Bessent flexibility on the WAM of US debt issuance — a politically valuable lever.
- **Implication for Circle:** Regulatory protection of the *stablecoin category* is now politically aligned with deficit financing. Circle as the cleanest, US-domiciled, GENIUS-compliant operator is the prime beneficiary. This is the foundation of the bull thesis even in a moderate rate-cut world: regulatory durability.
- **The risk going the other way:** If stablecoin T-bill demand becomes too large (>20% of bill outstanding), Treasury could become uncomfortable with the run-risk concentration (a stablecoin redemption wave forcing $200B of T-bill sales in a week). At that point, regulatory tightening could shift — e.g., capital requirements, mandated diversification into longer maturities (which would hurt Circle's yield). 5-year probability: low. 10-year probability: moderate.

## Macro Regime Fit

**Current regime assumption (May 2026):** Fed funds 3.50–3.75%, 10-year Treasury ~4.4%, 2-year Treasury ~3.9%, mild yield-curve dis-inversion. Headline inflation ~2.7%, core sticky in mid-2s. Dot plot points to one cut in 2026, terminal at 3.00–3.25% in 2027. Dollar index DXY rangebound. US fiscal deficit ~6% of GDP, Treasury issuance heavily skewed to bills.

**Fit verdict: winner — but conditional.**

In this regime Circle is well-positioned: front-end yields of 3.5–4% generate strong reserve income, USDC float is compounding 25%+ on EM digital-dollarization demand, GENIUS-Act tailwind is fully in place, and Treasury politically incentivized to nurture the channel. This is the bull's "muddle-through" world.

The scenarios that would flip the verdict:
- **Fed cuts to 1.5% or below in a recession by 2027–28** → loser. Even with float at $200B, reserve income compresses 50%+. Multiple compresses simultaneously. Equity could halve.
- **Yield-bearing stablecoin alternatives (Ondo USDY, BlackRock BUIDL) gain regulatory equivalence** → loser via TAM erosion (this is more of a competitive/regulatory question — handing off to those analysts).
- **Higher-for-much-longer (Fed funds plateau at 4.5%+ through 2028 due to structural inflation / fiscal-dominance dynamics)** → significant winner. Reserve income could exceed $3B by 2028. This is the upside-tail scenario that is currently *not* in consensus.

## Bull Points

- **GENIUS-Act-protected demand-side captive on US T-bills.** Circle's revenue model is now, in effect, federally codified: hold cash + bills + overnight repo. This is the regulatory equivalent of a moat against future re-regulation.
- **USD hegemony is being *re-platformed* via stablecoins.** Even as central-bank reserve share drifts down, retail/corporate dollar use is being expanded by stablecoin rails. Circle is the highest-quality public proxy for that expansion.
- **EM digital-dollarization is a multi-decade compounding tailwind.** Argentina, Turkey, Nigeria, and broad Africa/SE Asia are all in early innings of stablecoin penetration (10–15% of population in leaders, sub-5% in most laggards). 25%+ float CAGR is not heroic.
- **Treasury politically incentivized to protect the channel.** Stablecoin T-bill bid is now part of the deficit-financing toolkit. Material regulatory tightening would damage Treasury's own funding flexibility.
- **Crisis-tested reserve composition.** Post-2023 reform pushed reserves into a 2a-7 BlackRock fund; depeg risk is structurally lower than during the SVB episode.

## Bear Points

- **94%+ revenue concentration in a single line item that is fully variable with the front-end of the Treasury curve.** No other US-listed company of comparable scale has this profile. The equity is essentially a leveraged ETF on short-end yields with a USDC-float multiplier.
- **The distribution-share squeeze is structural.** Coinbase keeps 100% of yield on Coinbase-held USDC, and Coinbase wallet share of USDC has been *rising*. Circle's effective take-rate on its own float drifts down quietly each quarter.
- **ZIRP scenario is a multiple-and-revenue double-hit.** Going from 4% to 0.5% Fed funds compresses reserve income ~88% per dollar of float. Float growth cannot offset on a 1–2 year horizon.
- **Sanctions-compliance tradeoff caps EM share.** USDC will structurally trail USDT in the highest-growth EM dollarization markets (where users want non-frozeable assets). Circle's *quality* of float is high; its *quantity* is permanently capped relative to the sanction-agnostic competitor.
- **US sovereign tail risk.** A debt-ceiling technical default or T-bill liquidity event would crater the reserve fund and the peg. Tiny probability, severe magnitude, no hedge.

## Conviction (1–5)

**3 — Mid.** The macro setup is genuinely favorable in the modal regime — but the rate sensitivity is so extreme that the equity's expected return is dominated by what the Fed does in 2027–28, which is precisely the part of the rate curve I have least conviction on. For a 3–5 year horizon, the macro-tailwind asymmetry (USD hegemony, GENIUS protection, EM digital-dollarization, Treasury political alignment) is genuinely positive, but the dispersion of outcomes is wider than for any traditional financial. I'd own it sized as a bet on continued US fiscal-monetary regime — not as a high-conviction compounder.

## Key Risks to This Read

- **My base-case rate assumption (Fed funds 3.0–3.5% through 2028) could be wrong in either direction by 150bp.** Both tails matter, but the downside tail (cuts to 1–1.5%) is more damaging than the upside tail is helpful, because Circle's distribution-share economics give Coinbase the upside.
- **I'm assuming USDC float compounds 25%+ for 3+ years.** If GENIUS implementation creates a US bank-issued stablecoin wave (JPM, Citi, BoA each launch their own), USDC's institutional float could *de-grow* in 2027–28 even as the category grows.
- **I'm assuming Treasury continues to view stablecoins as a strategic asset.** A change of administration or a regulatory pivot — e.g., a stablecoin run forces Treasury to re-think — could flip the political tailwind to a headwind in 12–18 months.
- **The single regime change that would most flip my verdict to negative:** A coordinated G7 move to allow yield-bearing stablecoins (or to permit interest payments on stablecoin balances). This would let competitors (BlackRock BUIDL, bank-issued tokenized deposits) eat the most attractive USDC use-cases, even if rates stay high. The competitive-analyst should pressure-test this; I flag it because it's a *macro/regulatory regime* change, not a competitive event.

## Sources

- [Circle Reports First Quarter 2026 Results — Circle press release](https://www.circle.com/pressroom/circle-reports-first-quarter-2026-results)
- [Circle Q1 2026 revenue climbs 20% to $694M — StockTitan](https://www.stocktitan.net/news/CRCL/circle-reports-first-quarter-2026-6f52eszj6cyc.html)
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- [De-dollarization: The end of dollar dominance? — JPMorgan](https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/currencies/de-dollarization)
- [BRICS and the Shift Away from Dollar Dependence — Chicago Policy Review](https://chicagopolicyreview.org/2025/10/08/brics-and-the-shift-away-from-dollar-dependence/)
- [How stablecoins are extending the monetary power of the United States — LSE Business Review, May 2026](https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2026/05/12/how-stablecoins-are-extending-the-monetary-power-of-the-united-states/)
- [Stablecoins in Emerging Markets: The Cross-Border Payments Playbook for 2026 — Tazapay](https://tazapay.com/guides/stablecoins-cross-border-payments-emerging-markets)
- [Stablecoins and Emerging Markets — Goldman Sachs Global Institute](https://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/goldman-sachs-global-institute/articles/stablecoins-and-emerging-markets)
- [What Argentina, Nigeria, and Turkey Are Telling Us About the Future of Money — OpenTrade / Medium](https://medium.com/opentrade/what-argentina-nigeria-and-turkey-are-really-telling-us-about-the-future-of-money-8a2a250e133c)
- [BIS Annual Economic Report 2025 — BIS](https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2025e.pdf)
- [Stablecoin growth — policy challenges and approaches (BIS Bulletin 108) — BIS](https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull108.pdf)
- [Stablecoins and safe asset prices (BIS Working Paper 1270) — BIS](https://www.bis.org/publ/work1270.pdf)
- [Transparency & Stability — Circle (reserve disclosures)](https://www.circle.com/transparency)
- [USDC Reserve Asset Composition — MacroMicro](https://en.macromicro.me/charts/134291/world-usdc-reserve-asset-composition)
- [How stablecoins could affect borrowing costs — ABA Banking Journal](https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2025/07/how-stablecoins-could-affect-borrowing-costs-for-the-government-businesses-and-households/)